May 11, 2008
Battle for the Chouf
Walid Jumblatt has urged his supporters to stand down in the Chouf, which means he's told them to stand down completely. PSP (and possibly rival Arslan-clan, there's mixed reporting) offices are to be handed over to the Lebanese army.
I entertained the notion that Jumblatt telling his people not to fight in West Beirut was in order to fall back to a more defensible position. That doesn't seem like a realistic take right now. I talked to one of the frontline PSP fighters in Aley today, and he seemed pretty confused as to what Jumblatt was doing. He and his compatriots were chomping at the bit to fight and defend their turf, but lacked clear orders from above as well as ammunition.
Jumblatt is still holed up in his place in Clemenceau in West Beirut, so perhaps he's just playing it careful until he's in a less easily (as we saw two days ago) surrounded location. My good friend "Charles Malik" at Lebanese Political Journal was of the opinion that he's operating solely from the principle of community preservation. The theory being, Jumblatt has thrown in with the idea of a western aligned democratic Lebanon because it is the best thing for his community, and he is avoiding allowing Hezbollah to drag him into open warfare because it would jeopardize that state.
I'm not sure this plan of action accomplishes that goal, however. Hezbollah - well, no. Their proxies, first Amal and the SSNP in West Beirut, and this time opposition Druze in the Chouf - has been systematically neutering the disparate March 14 parties. Future was taken out with a vengeance. The PSP have now apparently been sidelined. That leaves the Christian parties untouched, and now without any robust allies to come to their aid if they're attacked.
Not that they came to their allies aid when they were attacked, though. The past few days has highlighted a huge weakness in March 14 - it's a coalition of often fractious parties, not a unified structure. There are no March 14 fighters, there are just Druze, and Sunni, and Christian. Combined they would still face long odds in an open fight against Hezbollah, but apart they're absolutely powerless.
March 14 was always faced with three basic choices. It could completely give in to opposition demands. It could give up some of its demands - demands it was very attached to - in order to get at least part of what it wanted. That's called compromise, and for all the rhetoric about comprise these past few months it wasn't very seriously explored or discussed. Or, third, they can refuse to give in at all and go to war.
Sadly, they seem to have chosen both A) and C), the proverbial worst of both worlds. And now that it's gone to the streets, B) is no longer a realistic option.
Lebanon is quickly heading for a moment - if it's not already there - where Hezbollah simply calls all the shots. How can you accept an armed invasion of your towns and neighborhoods and then go back to the negotiating table and expect to deal with your erstwhile occupiers on anything like an equal basis?
(In more personal news, my West Beirut friends have been able to return to their homes and apartments and try to pick up the pieces.)
Posted by ben at May 11, 2008 10:51 AM