Rational Grounds

Yeah, methinks it could all happen again, even with so much unfinished business on the Administration's plate. Iraq is in a hugely perilous state and the situation in Afghanistan (and parts of Pakistan) is very problematic (by the way, where are Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri?). So please be patient with me, over the coming weeks, as I seek to bring the temperature down on Iran policy musings a degree or two. Look, a military strike on Iran might ultimately prove necessary, especially if Ahmadi-Nejad is in power at the time Iran is actually about to get a nuclear weapon. His aggressive rhetoric must be taken seriously, and we very likely cannot risk a nuclear Iran led by such an unstable leader. But an Iran led by another less radical regime could be a different story, especially given positive demographic trends that point to a more moderate generation in the wings.

First, I think the point about Iraq still being a huge mess is important to this debate, but not in the way that everybody seems to have taken it so far. The conventional line of attack here is that - over and above any questions about the utility of military strikes in solving our problems with Iran - starting another war while we're still hip deep in Iraq (and knee deep in Afghanistan) is insane.

But the Administration may be seeing this a little differently. The thought process is rather staightforward, actually - we're having difficulties with Islamist terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran is run by Islamist terrorists, and is stirring things up in both places. If we bomb them and topple their regime, this will decrease the Islamist terrorist pressure on us in both places and finally allow democracy to flourish across the Middle East and Central Asia. Therefore, the fact that Iraq is still a huge mess is actually a reason for attacking Iran, not against.

This is wrong on almost all of its points, of course. Thinking these things requires a deep ignorance of the natures and compositions of the enemy forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the nature and interests of the Iranian government. But while I don't think everybody (or even most people) in the Administration are quite that far gone anymore, I can easily see this kind of clap-trap thriving in, say, the Office of the Vice President. And if there's one office in Washington that has more influence on US foreign policy they haven't declassified it yet. It's crazy, sure, but not bat-shit out-of-left-field crazy. It's the kind of crazy you might conceivably be able to play in Peoria.

Second, the point about Ahmadinejad is, I think, off base. Remember, this man holds the same awesome executive powers that Khatami held throughout his terms in office.

It's not Ahmadinejad you have to decipher here, but the real ruling power in Iran - Khameini and the Revolutionary Council that runs the judiciary and (more importantly) the military and intelligence services. They're the ones who are going to be making the real decisions, and I think that, rhetoric aside, they're much more Realist than Revolutionary at this point.

Had Iran had nuclear weapons under Khomeini in the 80s, I'm willing to believe that they would have used them (probably against Israel). Under Khomeini they proved repeatedly that they were willing to be self-destructive (to a point) in the pursuit of ideological goals.

Not today. Paraphrasing a professor of mine, one thing you have to remember about all of these guys - no matter how belligerent sounding or scary looking - they are all in the end politicians. They are all interested in their own power and survival. Using nuclear weapons, against Israel or any other US interest, is simply not a survivable mistake.