Rational Grounds

LIVE NOTES:

Ann Nelson introducing Michael Gordon of the New York Times and Robert George of the New York Post

Sometimes Intelligence Community talks about granular intel – where you see really detailed policy and planning day-by-day and minute by minute. This book is of that sort; you see the human element in decision making – events aren’t deterministic.

In the end of the book Michael Gordon talks about the grievous errors that went into the planning and execution of the Iraq War.

Ann Nelson: – brief bio of Michael Gordon followed by brief bio of Robert George:

Robert George:: Want to talk about policy formulations up to this point: (thanks) What’s interesting in Cobra II is that Michael Gordon says war is most covered and least understood conflict in recent times. Struck by Phil Graham’s quote - newspapers are the 1st draft of history. What’s happened over the past few years is that the 1st draft is completely wrong. We now have parallel discussion in DC talking about misleading intel on the one hand and incredibly heated debates on going into the war itself. Arguments over strategy and tactics and vision. Post’s philosophy is conservative; strongly supportive of Bush; still thinks removing Saddam was a good idea broadly and trying to establish democracy in ME is a good goal to have; in the long run will redound to US security benefit

Not here representing Post, just me. What’s interesting is that throughout conservative side there are rampant doubts on the above. William F. Buckley, George Will, Robert Novak, Newt Gingrich (supported at beginning, but says we should have gotten out by now).

Debate within admin – secretary of state is talking about tactical errors; Rumsfeld disagrees. Fascinating that some of strongest supporters of admin have been critical of Rumsfeld for a long time. Weekly Standard, e.g. (called for resignation a year ago).

A reporter of ours is strong supporter of the war, but by late 2004 didn’t think Rumsfeld was equipped to lead the war. This is coming to the fore now with the Generals.

Going forward, seeing what will happen with Iran and so forth,

Divisions between left and right here is not useful – lots of gray. Differences in support and advice across spectrum. Book is a great jumping off point for having more in depth discussions on these questions. Force us to ask much harder questions and more insightful questions about Iran.

Michael Gordon: glad to be here. Met Dan McSweeney (organizer) in Djibouti during Marine exercise; asked him then (fall 2002) when going back. Said sometime in January. I said they were going to Iraq – and sure enough. By fall 2002 it was obvious.

For The General’s War, tried to get a holistic account of everything that happened. When this war was happening, my plan was to do the same. Had a new reporting tool now called embedding to get this info. Going back to way it had been in previous conflicts.

I got in with central command thought this was where generals would be and could see planning and intel and etc. Really the only newspaper reporter there; good experience, lots of insight. How war was actually planned and fought. As events unfolded – tried to make most of opportunities and switched to 3rd infantry and went to Baghdad and Fallujah – went to 101st airborne in the north and then back to Baghdad. You could move around Iraq then; security situation far deteriorated now.

Visited battlefields with soldiers who’d fought there; in ensuing two years interviewed lots of people and officers; had access to lots of material this time – classified Iraqi Perspectives project gave a window into what the Iraqis were thinking and doing and what US thinking and doing during the war. Very good access with the military and civilian policy makers – couple didn’t come through in the end, one of them Rumsfeld.

Breaking down into different Iraq and US parts of the war; look at record of Saddam – not worried about the US as primary threat. Was looking at internal threat. Very rational guy. (Shia took over southern cities after 1991 war); Worried that in context of fight with US Shia would take advantage again; Deployed Saddam fedayeen under Uday to quell this; said not to destroy any bridges so he could use them later to take on the Shia (but helped US get to Baghdad). SH’s focus was within.

Externally, he was worried about Iran. Look back at Iran-Iraq War. Iran powerful, pursuing WMD. He thought confrontation would take the form of the last war. Sign Michael Gordon saw of this in Baghdad: palace was devoid of furniture and other stuff because regime thought it would be a target. Saw some of this stuff later in a warehouse, marked where it went in the house (ie, second room on fourth floor, etc.). Intended to put it all back afterwards.

Its important because it means that Saddam did not plan the insurgency. Never thought US would get to Baghdad. I have the escape route map for Saddam and his sons to Anbar province; haphazard. Split up after that – sons made it to Damascus, too hot to handle and returned to Iraq. Killed in Mosul; Saddam keeps moving and eventually found. Concern with Iran affected his handling of WMD issue.

Misread US, ultimately. Misread UN debate. Misread US strategy during war. We misread the Iraqi situation as well – strategy, enemy, etc. Equally profound mistakes. That’s why we’re here today. Made a catalog of the 5 grievous errors:

1) misread military; quite obvious that the principle enemy we had in mind was the Republican Guard; most loyal, capable forces; thought we would face chemical weapons; we would win once we took the capital and defeated those forces; but the fedayeen put out in the South with huge caches of arms and etc. these forces were unknown to CIA; became an element of the insurgency
2) “no plan survives contact with the enemy” but the key is that you adapt after you begin. CIA kept telling everyone that the southern cities were ours – we should be prepared to conduct joint raids with Shiite forces; didn’t find that, obviously. Forces adapted very well, but still a challenge. Wanted to stop and fix the paramilitary problem before continuing to Baghdad. But Franks and Rumsfeld wanted to press forward faster; didn’t think these fights were as significant as they were; misread the battlefield. Attitude at senior levels that army too cautious. Quote by the general that “the enemy we’re fighting is not the one we war-gamed against.” Obvious truth in the field, explosive in DC. Franks threatened to fire Wallace for saying it. McKiernan had to talk him down for that.
3) Also needed to flow the rest of the reinforcements to Iraq; Rumsfeld and Franks decided to cancel reinforcements as Baghdad fell. Cancelled 1st Cavalry deployment – remember, they thought the war was about over at that point. When Bush says field commanders got everything they wanted, that is simply not correct. Rumsfeld led on this decision, but Franks went along. This is all before we’ve been to Fallujah or anywhere else except the drive to Baghdad. We were a little short of forces when capital fell.
4) When Bremer came in he disbanded the Iraqi army. Generals knew they didn’t have enough forces to control Iraq – close borders, patrol cities, etc. Plan was to make use of the Iraqi army to control country with us. Bremer’s de-Baathfication was then extended to army – this approved by Rumsfeld, without knowledge of Rice, Powell, or Chiefs of Staff. Generals very unhappy with how Iraqi army handled. Created a security vacuum.
5) Coming into war, Bush admin had a very different attitude towards nation-building than, say, Clinton. In Balkans, went in with lots of troops and poured lots of effort into nation building. Critics went into Bush admin; attitude that this process created dependence and that’s why were still there. Rice, Rumsfeld, Bush, etc., all said this in campaign. We aren’t going to do that in Iraq, get them to do it for themselves (tough love, hit the ground running, pay for itself via oil).

Key is they did do planning. It was bad planning. Example with police – people realized that after regime was toppled there could be a problem with maintaining order. Talabani, e.g. Justice dept. planning for police force in Iraq. Administration rejected this – Iraqis were going to police Iraq. Problem was that Iraqi police vanished and weren’t any good anyway. Bernie Kerik did nothing either. Idea that we were going to rely on them to do the nation building.

Population soured on the occupation because of problems generated by the above. We were welcomed as liberators in some cases. Insurgency begins to take hold over summer of 2003; got progressively worse.

I tried to put as much of this on the record as possible. All generals feel that there was a window of opportunity summer 2003 to change/fix policies. That window is closed. Everything since has been on the job training belatedly trying to dig our way out of this hole. That’s the thesis of the book, backed up with reporting and evidence. Questions?

Robert George:: quick response. Question of the day is how much is some of the criticism of Rumsfeld not just specific Iraq problems and actually about military transformation pushback?

Michael Gordon: Rumsfeld came in to transform the military; didn’t invent it, but that was his thing. Basic idea has some merit; not a guy to win friends – came in very sure of himself and very dismissive of Joint Chiefs of Staff; belief that he would really have to force this on the military; put his own personnel in place (Myers, Pace) seen as team players who would work with him. Weren’t the kind of guys to stand up to him. Read Gen. Newbaum’s article and criticism’s of military people around Rumsfeld. If we’re apportioning blame, have to share it b/w Rumsfeld and top military brass who didn’t stand up to him. Shinseki’s attempted lesson in Congress – that it take’s more forces to occupy a country than to tear down a regime - Army understood this, but civilians didn’t/couldn’t get it.

Ann Nelson:: Is there an Air Force/Army split on Iran?

Michael Gordon: Don’t know any military that’s talking about Iran. Nobody’s talking about invading Iran. It would be air strikes. Ret. Gen’s who have spoken out have been Army and Marines because they’ve carried the burden wrt Iraq.

Robert George:: Historical significance of the Ret. Gen’s coming out and criticizing Rumsfeld? Not seen that I can remember.

Michael Gordon: Problems between civilian and military authorities before – MacArthur – but this is unusual. Talked to a number of these officers – this is not coordinated. A few came out of the closet, so to speak, and this gave heart to others. Then media gets interested and sounding out more and more generals if they can. Forces generals to decide where they stand. Response to the generals is coordinated, though.

Different motivations. Zinni always against the war. Newbaum against it also – briefed Rumsfeld on plans before it. It’s deeply embedded in US military to follow the civilian leadership. Batiste, Swannack, division commanders in Iraq not against the war but the implementation. That’s more damning, to me. One thing that’s clear is significant current in the military that is sympathetic to these people.

One guy he’s talked to doesn’t think that calling for Rumsfeld’s resignation is appropriate, but decided to retire because he didn’t want to work for a guy like Rumsfeld.

Don’t think this is going to make him resign, out of spite. Bush won’t order it either. Now there’s an awkward situation where US military doesn’t trust civilian leadership – not sure how that’ll be resolved.

Questions from the audience– What have you guys been doing for the last three years? You’ve been reporting on the military for a long time? No questions for the last three years? Where was Trainer’s voice? Where’s the press going with this, especially the New York Post?

Michael Gordon: Think you need to think harder about role of the press. Press has done a good job. If you listen to Rumsfeld’s description of goings on in Baghdad after invasion – deceptive, etc. – reluctance to face up to problems in Iraq in administration. Media giving basically realistic account even so. Complaints of not covering good stuff, but much more accurate if you go back and look – especially compared to admin’s accounts.

Shinseki’s statements on troop levels were a front page story. It’s not media’s job to come up with answers for these things; job to accurately describe events in Iraq. They’ve done that.

Robert George:: speaking only for myself. Personally think Rumsfeld should have been fired back in 2004. But hindsight is 20/20 – facts were not so obvious at the time. Others believed WMD issue. Liberal writers believed it, even believing not right to invade. Sure, media blew it, Times had mea culpa on some of its reporting. Where do we go next? Even amongst conservative media there’s some more variety of opinion.

Question: Combatant commanders refusing to launch operations or significantly amending them?

Michael Gordon: didn’t happen, that I know of. A little bit the reverse. Field forces trying to be more aggressive and be reigned in. Famous “thunder run” on April 7th that takes the capital. Going down to regime area of Baghdad and keep open supply line. Upper echelons thought it was too audacious – said go down and turn around. Forces went ahead and went downtown and stayed instead. Surprised superiors. “Accidental victory.” Senior commanders then had to adapt to unexpected success – shifted forces around and supported guys in Baghdad. Story of how Baghdad fell.

Don’t know of any cases where forces refused jobs.

Question: intel hearings on capital hill – what was the intel situation? And is the Iran thing a Republican election strategy?

Robert George:: not sure about intel committee situation. Senate Dems threatened to shut down senate if Republicans didn’t have the rest of the intel hearings. Don’t know where that is now. In 2002 and 2004 security issue clearly worked to Republican benefit. Not sure of the strategy this time around. Making Iran next bad guy doesn’t really make much sense politically. Iran leader is being quite threatening without us having to saber rattle. In context of Iraq I don’t see making Iran the bad guy is going to work – but it is a legitimate security problem

Michael Gordon: intel was very poor on the war, basically, read it for yourself. NIE 2002 on WMD and Al Qaeda has been declassified. Intel wasn’t manufactured but White House in public statements presented slanted view. Not the case that the Democrats were duped. Many disputes are in the report and if they read it carefully… shows the intel wasn’t manufactured, but just not well done. Both parties have taken liberties with this issue.

Question: Private contractor effect?

Michael Gordon: A little more trigger happy sometimes. Bad for the situation.

Question: How does discipline/legal system work for them?

Michael Gordon: Don’t know.

Question: After Vietnam war, didn’t they stop military micromanaging by civilian leaders? What happened?

Michael Gordon: There is a role for them to make suggestions and etc. Once war is underway, Rumsfeld not picking the targets. In 1st chapter, existing war plan by Newbaum and Zinni and Franks called for 380,000 troops (driven by phase four of war – occupation) Rumsfeld dismisses it. But nobody questioned him, really. Nobody says a word. Franks tasked with making new plan – makes shrunken version of that plan; rebuffed. Begins the “negotiation.” Perfectly right to ask questions and challenge generals – but surprising that there wasn’t more push back. I actually think that if generals had made the case, then White House would have accepted it. No President wants to go to war with generals who believe they weren’t given enough to do the job – politically destructive when that comes out.

Robert George:: How does Franks in particular, given he had worked with Zinni et al., not end up pushing back?

Michael Gordon: Good question. Worked within his parameters – my understanding that Franks and Zinni have not spoken since Zinni left.

Question: As to pushing back, any connection between recent developments and these plans coming out of Iran? Reaction to those plans? And policy makers in pentagon vs. trigger shooters on the ground conflicts?

Robert George:: Newbaum seems to be referencing Iran obliquely.

Michael Gordon: Have not specifically referenced Iran, probably a factor though. Key decisions coming down the pike – how fast to leave Iraq, e.g. Obviously plan is to reduce our exposure there. Not a one-for-one substitution. If you’ve trained 100,000 new Iraqi soldiers that’s not equivalent to 100,000 US soldiers. Iran is in the back of people’s minds. Doug Feith and Wolfowitz didn’t make military decisions. Political, strategic maybe.

Question: Wolfowitz did ridicule Shinseki.

Michael Gordon: But so did Rumsfeld – not defending their actions. Didn’t have military consequences – Shinseki wasn’t in chain of command.

Thanks to both of our guests! Books for sale, etc. etc.