July 08, 2005

On International Aid

For information and thoughts on international aid, one of your first stops should be my good friend Matt at the appropriately named TheNeedful.org. Virtually all of the links in this post are via him, and he's got plenty more where they came from.

That said, the debate on aid to developing nations, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, continues apace on my SIPA mailing list. There's been a fairly good breakdown of the problems with different aid strategies, but not a whole lot in the way of suggestions for how to fix them. That's to be expected for two main reasons. First, there seems to be no widespread consensus on how to fix these things in the world community right now, so we can't expect a few score young professionals to brainstorm up some solutions in 24 hours. Second, the list comprises entering first-year students, and one of the main reasons we're spending the next two years at Columbia is to study these questions and formulate possible answers there. Even so, I'd like to summarize some of the specific factors that have been brought up and perhaps propose a couple ideas.

(My perspective and proposals for solutions, where they are not directly addressing things said on the mailing list, are largely guided by George Soros' discussion of International Aid in his book On Globalization and from the links and information provided through The Needful.)

The consensus seems to be that right now Africa is consuming huge amounts of aid with little or nothing to show for it. There are several reasons for this. One, the aid delivered is not reaching the people and projects that really need it. Corruption swallows the lion's share of the money, and inept or corrupt governments create catastrophic inefficiencies throughout the supply chains for the aid that does get through. Two, the high levels of aid and debt relief are fostering cultures dependence and fiscal irresponsibility. If the money keeps rolling in and the way out of debt is to just ignore it, there will never be any incentive to fix the underlying problems.

As I mentioned before, I believe that the solution (from an outsider's perspective) to the economic and humanitarian problems in Africa is going to be a mixture of economic aid and political reform. The key question is how to effectively combine the two to produce both immediate relief of poverty and suffering as well as long term economic growth and political stability. High levels of aid are absolutely vital to alleviating the immediate humanitarian crises plaguing Africa today, and I applaud those individuals and groups working to get developed countries to donate more money and expertise. However, just as pointing a fire hose at thirsty people doesn't really help anybody, simply signing a few oversized checks is likewise insufficient. That aid needs to be properly managed, from the donor to the administrators, through the distribution system, and to the end recipients. Money without commitment is not aid, it's just PR.

Unfortunately, I can't provide many general recommendations to fix this, as it will always be largely a matter of implementation details. That said, properly administering an aid program takes a lot of work, an ability to adapt to your program to changing situations on the ground, and patience. It needs to grow local institutions, civic culture and the economy - not government programs. Government programs run on aid will always require more aid later. Economic growth jump started with aid will eventually be self-sustaining.

A proper aid program also requires acknowledging the differences between dysfunctional, nonfunctional, and actively repressive governments and the different strategies aid programs need to use in dealing with each. In brief, dysfunctional governments will need a great deal of guidance, monitoring, and training to make aid effective; nonfunctional states will need an entire bureaucracy to act as a stand-in government; and repressive governments will need to be avoided and marginalized as much as possible. This last scenario should see aid funneled through local and international NGOs, with little actual cash involved.

In all the above cases, encouraging reform is necessary to ensure that the aid does not act as merely a band-aid but instead helps build a lasting basis for economic growth and development. As was previously pointed out, this comes with problems too. Political and economic reforms that are linked to aid can be used as levers for a donor country or countries to rewrite local regulations in their own economic or political favor. Poor countries in dire straits usually have little room to refuse aid when it is offered and are thus wide open to exploitation. Going back to the previous comments about proper aid management and commitment, aid programs need the appropriate level of management and involvement. Too little will result in the "fire hose" effect, and too much becomes simple imperialism, however well intentioned.

Naturally, if aid is going to really work the people behind the wheel have to have the proper goals in mind. I would think the ability of NGOs to "name and shame" could be heavily employed to help keep donor countries honest about their aid packages. That's a rather weak check, however, so perhaps international aid oversight through the UN, IMF, or World Bank would be more effective.

The bottom line is, as problematic as aid is stopping it or rolling it back is not the answer. There are ways to funnel aid through the proper people, even in repressive or kleptocratic regimes. There are projects and movements that can be aided that are going to add to the civic culture and basic economy of the poor nations that can be aided instead of funding government bureaucracies or paying for mass hand-outs. The key is to not only be generous, but be serious about what you intend to accomplish with that generosity and involved in the entire aid process from start to finish.

Posted by ben at July 8, 2005 10:41 PM

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