July 16, 2007
Iraq, the Surge and, the Impact on the US Army
A radio interview by Dennis Raimondi with BG(retired) Kevin Ryan discussing the Iraq surge, its impact on the Army and, its likely outcomes.
To listen - visit "Speaking Freely with Dennis", KRUU 100.1 FM, at
http://speakingfreelywithdennis.com/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=90&Itemid=36
Posted by kryan at 07:51 PM | Comments (0)
July 07, 2007
Military Manpower and Iraq
(originally posted) 21 June 2007
A compilation of recent developments and information concerning US military manpower and Iraq.
The Surge and the Upcoming September Report
Iraq Operations Overview
Iraq Army Readiness
US Army Readiness
Iraq Operations Overview Map
The Surge and the Upcoming September Report
This month Colonel Mike Meese, the head of West Point’s social sciences department and one of General Petraeus’ “jedi strategists,” left for Iraq for a second time this year to join other select planners in crafting Petraeus’ report and recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq. Petraeus’ team is already hard at work drafting his assessment on the surge, which is due to Congress and the President by this September. Although the report will not come out until the end of summer the outlines are already visible.
The Surge.
On 17 June, General David Petraeus gave an interview to Fox News in which he said that he is still committed to providing a report in September that will “provide a reasonable snapshot of the situation at that time and how things have gone in the surge, both in the security and then in the political and economic arenas” as well as “recommendations on the way ahead.”
Petraeus told Fox that he would be able to provide a realistic sense of whether the surge is working or not by his September report. But, he also said that he already knew that the surge will not have accomplished its goals by September. WALLACE: “surely [you] don't think the job would be done by the surge by September, do you, sir? PETRAEUS: “I do not, no. I think that we have a lot of heavy lifting to do.”
LTG Ray Odierno, Petraeus’ deputy in charge of combat operations, has said before that he believes it will be 2008 before the effects of the surge will really take hold. Odierno told Pentagon reporters on 31 May that his input on the surge for the September report will be one of three assessments, “I've seen enough and it's effective, or I've seen enough and it's not going to be effective,” or “I need a little more time.” “ Right now if you asked me, I would tell you I'd probably need a little bit more time to do a true assessment.”
Petraeus’ Plan for the Way Ahead
Secretary Gates told reporters on a flight to the Shangri-La Donors’ Conference on 1 June that the important issue now is “how we posture ourselves for the long term, both in the region and in Iraq.” He said that Petraeus’ team is developing a plan for what that presence should be, and he expects that will be part of the September report.
Noting that the situation in Iraq was not going to “be resolved in a year or two,” Petraeus told Fox News that the question was not whether we should remain in Iraq but at what levels we should remain. Petraeus said that he agreed with those in Washington who supported “some form of long-term security arrangement over time,” and he claimed that his recommendations would include various courses of action and their implications. Petraeus said that it will then be “up to the policymakers and to the legislators to determine the course ahead.”
The model for Petraeus’ long-term presence in Iraq can be found in the northern province of Kirkuk. In an 8 June DoD news briefing, Col. Patrick Stackpole, commander of the 5,000-man 3d Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, described his operation in the 1.5 million-person province with mixed Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite groups. According to Stackpole, violence has actually increased over the last two years in the province. However, Iraqi units lead the security effort there with Stackpole’s brigade providing backup support as well as embedded trainers and advisors: a 911 unit for the Iraqis. His brigade has conducted over 900 operations with its Iraqi partner unit. In addition, the brigade supports the Provincial Reconstruction Team and has overseen contracts worth $30 million in various public works, construction and business development projects. Despite the increased violence, the US commander is optimistic about the ability of the Iraqis to control the province.
Stateside Expectations of the September Report
Stateside, there are different expectations for the report in September. Many legislators believe that the September report will be a decision point to stop the surge and provide a path toward drawdown of forces. Somewhat lost in the discussion are the actual report requirements written into the funding law passed by Congress and the President.
Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) said on CBS's Face The Nation on Sunday that he expects the US "surge" in Iraq to come to an end in September, a sentiment that deviates greatly from the official White House and military stance. "I think that everybody anticipates that this is going to be a new strategy in the fall. I don't think we'll have the same level of troops, in all likelihood, that we have now," he said. "We're not [in Iraq] forever." [TheRawStory] McConnell reflects what many hope will be a part of the report in September, but likely will not be in Petraeus’ recommendation.
The actual reporting requirement written into the funding law requires the President to report to Congress before 15 July and again before 15 September on how the Iraqis are meeting 18 established benchmarks. It also requires Petraeus and Crocker to testify to Congress in advance of the 15 September report. The law requires the President to include in his report any changes he makes in the Iraq strategy as a result of his assessment, but it does not require a specific decision on troop numbers or ending the surge. Among the 18 benchmarks are: enacting legislation on de-Baathification, enacting legislation that ensures equal distribution of hydrocarbon resources, reducing the level of sectarian violence, and enacting legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions. Current trends suggest that about half of the benchmarks may be met by September.
Conclusion. It appears that the report given by Petraeus and Crocker will recommend continuing the surge into summer 2008 and will recommend a long-term (indefinite) presence for US forces. They will claim that the surge and the Iraqi government’s response have delivered mixed, but overall positive, results and therefore deserve continued support. There will be little or no comment on the effect that the continued surge is having on the Army and Marines and their long-term readiness and institutional health.
Iraq Operations Overview
Iraqi security forces have the lead for security operations in 8 of the country’s 18 provinces as of the end of May. US and coalition forces remain deployed in those areas where Iraqi forces lead, but they perform supporting roles providing aviation, artillery, and logistical support as well as combat power when needed. Prime Minister Maliki, who earlier had estimated that Iraqi units would be able to lead in all provinces by the end of 2006, now believes it can happen by the end of 2008.
The five US “surge brigades” which the President authorized back in January 2007 are now on station creating a combined US, coalition, and Iraqi force of 154,000 troops in and around Baghdad.
The US has six brigades in Baghdad and eight more in so-called “belts” around Baghdad from where extremists often launch attacks into the city; a total of about 50,000 troops. More than 79,000 Iraqi security forces have been deployed to the city: 22 Iraqi security force brigades (containing 35 Iraqi army battalions and 19 national police battalions). In addition there are more than 25,000 local Iraqi police in the city. (The US has another six brigade size combat units deployed around Iraq for a total US combat force of 20 brigades.)
According to LTG Ray Odierno, "This is all about establishing 24-hour, seven-day-a-week presence inside the city of Baghdad and protecting people where they sleep." "Currently, we have 28 joint security stations and 28 combat outposts operating throughout greater Baghdad area." Odierno told reporters on 31 May that he estimated that about 40% of the city was under control. Petraeus estimated on 17 June that the number was closer to 70%.
Iraq Army Readiness
The June 2007 edition of the quarterly report, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," noted the continued buildup of Iraq's security forces, which now number 347,000, up almost 18,000 since the last report, released in March. US chief of Iraqi army training, LTG Dempsey, said that the Iraqi army will grow further in 2007 and 2008 because it still lacks sufficient forces to protect the country.
Nine Iraqi divisions, 31 brigades, and 95 battalions, are in the lead or operating independently in their areas, the report notes. That's an increase of one division headquarters and two battalions since the last report.
Iraqi units still have difficulty maintaining 100% of their strength through a deployment. LTG Dempsey told reporters that daily absentees remain around 15% overall for Iraqi units. But that number spikes to 50% when Iraqi units are asked to deploy from their home station. Iraqi army units are now sent to a predeployment training site in Besmaya prior to assignment in Baghdad improving their performance and manning. The first three Iraqi surge brigades to Baghdad were “plussed up” to 110% during training but still served at 75% fill throughout their 90-day deployment. Dempsey said that leaders are trying to ensure that replacement units train at 120% in the hope of achieving 85% fill when they serve.
US Army Readiness
Predictably, surging an extra 5 combat brigades into Iraq is having a negative effect on the US Army and its readiness. In the initial acceleration of units into Iraq to raise the number of brigades from 15 to 20, units cut short training by about 3 months and hurried to theater. In order to make deployments more predictable and to guarantee stateside units with a minimum time for resetting and training before deployment, Secretary Gates ordered that Army units would have 12 months at home base and 15 months in theater (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait). Army units will serve in Iraq for 15 months and out for 12 until the surge is stopped.
The Army has 39 brigades in the active component and cannot maintain the surge in Iraq along with commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere without remobilizing National Guard brigades to help shoulder the burden. As a result, Secretary Gates has authorized the remobilization of four Army National guard brigades for Iraq. In accordance with recent DoD policy changes, those units can only be mobilized for 12 months so their tours of duty in Iraq will be something less than 15 months: about 9-10 months.
Army Recruiting Command missed its active duty recruiting goal in May for the first time since the fall of 2005, causing some concern among Army leaders. However, the Army is ahead of its goal for the year because of better than expected recruiting in previous months. The Army Reserve continues to fail to meet recruiting goals achieving only about 80% of its demands. The Guard is still on target for the year after faltering in April. It remains to be seen whether the summer months (typically the Army’s best recruiting months) will deliver the high numbers needed to meet annual goals.
A Time magazine article in May claimed that the Army was short about 50% of its authorized captains. Separate discussions with Army personnel officers suggest that the article was correct, although the Army is not commenting publicly. This shortage would be a serious blow to readiness at the company and battalion levels, the level where counterinsurgencies are fought. In addition it would be an alarm that the high deployment rates have begun to fulfill expectations of wear and tear on the service. The Army has announced a program to give captains from the shortage year groups a $20,000 bonus if they stay in past their commitment, but if the Time article is correct, it has come too late. The only way to make up the loss is to encourage officers to rejoin the service.
BG Kevin Ryan (USA retired) Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
Posted by kryan at 04:02 PM | Comments (0)
July 06, 2007
Plans in Iraq Must Be Based on Realistic Demands
Originally published in Seattle Post-Intelligencer (24 May 2007).
This week, a second round of surge units were announced for Iraq as the number of troops in that country builds to its highest level ever. Gen. David Petraeus has told President Bush that he needs until September to see if conditions on the ground warrant continuing the surge.
But earlier this month, the Army had a chance to brief the president on a different set of conditions. On May 10 in the Pentagon's "Tank" briefing room, the Army told the president in detail about the conditions on the ground, not for units in Iraq, but for the units getting ready to go to Iraq. We've had plenty of warning that the message would be pessimistic. It undoubtedly was.
In November, then CENTCOM commander John Abizaid told Congress that he knew the Army couldn't sustain a surge of 20,000 troops. A month later, the president ordered almost 30,000 more troops to go. So did Abizaid. A balance of barely one year at home for each year at war was shattered and units began redeploying to Iraq for 15-month tours with less than a year preparation. The result was a downward spiral in readiness in units preparing to deploy.
The author of the surge, Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, had predicted in November that his idea might require units to deploy "not as well trained as one would like." No one can accuse him of not appreciating the impact of his plan on conditions in the Army. It got so bad by April that Defense Secretary Robert Gates had to order the Army to keep units home a minimum of a year so troops wouldn't deploy into combat lacking equipment and training.
Our ability to react to any other crises is almost zero. Retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who has traveled to the war zone and studied the situation firsthand, told Congress in April that 40 percent of the Army and Marine Corps equipment is either in Iraq or in repair. McCaffrey told Congress it will require $212 billion and years to repair that equipment. The National Guard estimates that 80 percent of its units in the states are incapable of performing their wartime mission. Those facts were undoubtedly part of the Army's brief to the president.
The morale of the troops remains high against all odds, and they will still be the best soldiers in the world by any measure, even after the surge.
But the institution of our Army has been contorted beyond recognition to sustain untenable deployment levels. The Army Times reported this month that only four Army brigades out of 39 remain available in the U.S. for other contingencies. For the past four years, strategic planning staffs have reinforced tactical staffs working near-term crises rather than thinking ahead to future conflicts.
Training units, the greenhouses of our force, are gutted to provide cadre for deploying units. Tomorrow's armor and artillery battalion commanders are growing up expert in infantry tactics but knowing little about their own branches. It will be years before we regain our balance between operations, training and manpower.
At the briefing with the president, the Army's chief, Gen. George Casey, undoubtedly told him all that. What Casey wouldn't have told the president was how to proceed in Iraq, because he isn't calling those shots anymore.
It's Petraeus, Casey's replacement in Baghdad, who has that job, and his plan remains based on conditions in Iraq, not back home. His idea to enhance security by concentrating troops in Baghdad and Anbar province and dispersing them into neighborhoods is essentially sound.
But it must be done with fewer U.S. troops. Until conditions on the ground back here are included in the calculations, our oversized plan will continue to bankrupt our ability to sustain it. The Army has said repeatedly that to sustain a deployed force for a long time in Iraq we need to draw down to about 10 brigades (or about 100,000 troops). If this truly is a "long war" and, if we are serious about not abandoning Iraq and the region, we need plans based on realistic demands. We will lose the race if we continue to run this marathon like a sprint.
________________________________________
Retired Brig. Gen. Kevin T. Ryan is a senior fellow with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and a 29-year veteran of the U.S. Army. His last active duty assignment was deputy director for Army strategy, plans and policy.
Posted by kryan at 08:45 PM | Comments (0)