N status - "Funny how when you're paid well, you do very little work and when you do work to the point of exhaustion, you get paid very little. The irony."

2:17 PM me: Marxist
2:18 PM N: hey hey
I'm stating my current conditions
I got home at 8 yesterday
at my old job
I usually got in at 4
2:20 PM me: yes yes
but it's a brief jump from some mild class consciousness to full blown revolution, as you and your intern comrades rise up and take back the means of production
or whatever it is you do there
2:21 PM analysts... the means of deduction?
N: we do have a small union
intern representation
so we are somewhat marxist
what can I say
me: I believe it's usually: "Workers of the world, unite."
N: hahahaha
2:22 PM and I keep a hammer and sickle under my desk
ok sunshine, I need to get things did
I'll ttyl
2:23 PM me: dasvidanya
N: da

But I don't have that time in part because I spend so much time with friends and colleagues these days, both on and offline. And in the process I'm constantly discussing profound, humorous, tragic and otherwise noteworthy things.

So my idea. Why not make that work for my blog, instead of against it? Rather than high maintenance linking and running commentary on the issues du jour, simply record for posterity some of the more interesting bon mots from my daily life?

It's an experiment. Let's see how it works.

Orascom, Zain win Lebanon mobile contracts
Reuters
Tue Jan 13, 2009
BEIRUT, Jan 13 (Reuters) - Egypt's Orascom Telecom (ORTE.CA) (ORTEq.L) and Kuwait's Mobile Telecommunications Co (Zain) (ZAIN.KW) won contracts to operate Lebanon's two fledgling mobile firms, a cabinet statement said on Monday night.
"These two companies have ... experience in the Lebanese market that allows them to manage well and positions them as the best companies to run this sector in Lebanon," Information Minister Tareq Mitri said.

Lebanon interest rates seen stable or lower in '09
Reuters
01.13.09
BEIRUT, Jan 13 (Reuters) - Lebanese interest rates will be stable and could fall in 2009, central bank governor Riad Salameh said on Tuesday. ...
The authorities were working on steps to stimulate lending in Lebanese pounds, he added, describing such a shift as 'a qualitative step' that would give a bigger role to monetary policy in stimulating the economy.
Lebanon's Ministry of Finance had also asked local and international banks to make proposals for terms to rollover $2.6 billion of Lebanese Eurobonds that are due to mature in 2009, he added.

Israeli forces intensify Gaza offensive
Reuters
Tue Jan 13, 2009
By Nidal al-Mughrabi
GAZA (Reuters) - Israeli forces tightened their hold around the city of Gaza on Tuesday and Israel's top general said "there is still work" ahead against Hamas in an 18-day-old offensive that has killed more than 900 Palestinians.
Explosions and heavy machinegun fire echoed through the city of 500,000 after Israeli tanks drew closer to its densely populated center but did not enter, local residents said.

Protests in Lebanon, Syria against Gaza offensive
Associated Press
By ZEINA KARAM – January 11, 2009
BEIRUT, Lebanon (AP) — An estimated 2,500 Lebanese and Palestinians protested peacefully in downtown Beirut on Sunday against Israel's offensive in the Gaza Strip, as hundreds of demonstrators in neighboring Syria shouted insults at the both the Jewish state and Arab leaders.
Angry protests have swept the Arab world since Israel's bombing campaign in Gaza began on Dec. 27 to stop rocket fire from the militant Palestinian group Hamas. Gaza health officials say more than 820 Palestinians have been killed, roughly half of them civilians. Thirteen Israelis have also died. [...]

Hamas fires missiles at IDF jets
Yediot Ahronoth
Hanan Greenberg
January 11, 2009
Hamas attempting to hit IAF warplanes flying over Gaza: Defense establishment officials said Sunday that several attempts have been made to hit Israel Air Force jets attacking targets the Gaza Strip since the start of Operation Cast Lead 16 days ago.
Hamas gunmen reportedly attempted to shoot down warplanes using antiaircraft missiles several days ago. There were [no] injuries or damage in this incident. [...]

Israel warns Gaza residents of 'new phase' of offensive
By Richard Boudreaux and Rushdi abu Alouf
January 11, 2009
Reporting from Gaza City and Jerusalem -- Israel's aircraft pounded Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip on Saturday and scattered leaflets warning of an escalation in attacks, but there was no sign that its forces had begun a major advance on the militant group's urban strongholds.

A senior Hamas commander and seven members of a Palestinian family were among those killed on the 15th day of Israel's thundering air and artillery assault, which also damaged a hospital. Palestinian militants fired 15 rockets into Israel, wounding three people. […]

Diplomatic efforts to end the fighting sputtered as Egypt rebuffed a proposal to place international forces along its border to help prevent weapons smuggling into Gaza. Israel says the offensive is aimed at stopping rocket fire from Gaza and will continue until weapons pipelines into the Hamas-ruled coastal enclave are cut off. […]

Palestinian medical officials said Saturday that nearly half the 830 Gazans killed in the offensive were civilians. Israeli news media said the army estimated that it had killed 300 militants.

Thirteen Israelis have been killed: 10 soldiers, plus three civilians hit in Israel by rocket fire.

The army said its ground forces killed Amir Mansi, commander of Hamas' rocket-launching teams in Gaza City, after spotting him at a launch site there. Hamas confirmed his death.

With most Israeli ground forces holding their positions and Hamas eluding confrontation, the fighting has been relatively light in the last few days. Hamas has continued to fire rockets into Israel, but at a daily rate far below the recent peak of 80 launched on Christmas Day.

Saturday's heaviest encounters were reported along the coastal road north of Gaza City, where Israeli forces moved to within a mile of the city before pulling back slightly.[...]

Names of Palestinian Militants Involved in Katyusha Attack on Israel Revealed
Press reports on Sunday disclosed the names of Palestinian militants involved in the Katyusha attack on northern Israel, but Lebanese security sources denied Hamas was behind the rocket fire.

The daily al-Balad identified the Palestinian suspects arrested for allegedly firing rockets from southern Lebanon into Israel on Thursday as Imad J.A., Jamil A.A., Mahmoud A.S., Jamal A.D. and Ayman A.J.

It said among the arrested was also Iyad B, a Palestinian-Jordanian.

An Nahar newspaper on Sunday also quoted Cabinet sources as saying the government had obtained a report from the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon saying that the rocket attackers "enjoy a high level of professionalism." [...]

New Resistance Group Conducts 1st Training Maneuvers in Lebanon
The Arab Islamic Resistance, a new group rival of Hizbullah, revealed in a statement Sunday that it had conducted its first field training maneuvers in south and east Lebanon.

The statement, carried by state-run National News Agency, said its fighters carried out field maneuvers that included military exercise as well as civil defense and first aid training.

Arab Islamic Resistance Secretary General Sayyed Mohammed Ali al-Husseini said his fighters "have advanced abilities that would surprise the Israeli enemy if it dared carry out any offensive on Lebanon."

Husseini said Thursday's Katyusha attack on Israel was a "clear message" to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak that "you have to stop your ground assault on our people in Gaza."

"Next time rockets will be fired to kill," Husseini warned, adding that those who launched the Katyushas were "professionals." [...]

PFLP-GC Set Up Missile Platforms in Qossaya Directed toward Israel
Intelligence reports spoke of "suspicious activity" over the past three days at the military camp of Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command in Qossaya in east Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

The daily al-Liwaa on Friday said high-ranking Western diplomatic sources in Beirut said they have found out that there were "serious intentions" to aggravate the situation in southern Lebanon through some undisciplined and non-Lebanese factions.

Al-Liwaa, citing one intelligence source, said about 15 vehicles entered the Qossaya base over the past three days. The move, it said, coincided with repositioning rocket launching pads. [...]

Casualties in Pro-Gaza Rally in Akkar
At least five people have been wounded in a pro-Gaza rally in the northern province of Akkar, the daily al-Mustaqbal said Sunday.
It said residents from Haysheh and others from Wadi Khaled clashed Saturday with sticks and stones after members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party waved the party's flag during a rally in support of Gaza. [...]

Peace Is No Longer in Sight
By Tom Segev
Sunday, January 11, 2009
[...] I belong to a generation of Israelis who grew up believing in peace. At the end of the Six-Day War of 1967, I was 23, and I had no doubt that 40 years later, the Israeli-Arab war would be over. Today, my son, who is 28, no longer believes in peace. Most Israelis don't. They know that Israel may not survive without peace, but from war to war, they have lost their optimism. So have I. [...]

Don't go to Lebanon, 'runaways' warn aspiring OFWs
KIMBERLY JANE T. TAN, GMANews.TV
01/10/2009
MANILA, Philippines - Three Filipino women who sought work in Lebanon despite a ban are urging others who aspiring to go there not to do so.

The trio aired their appeal on Vice President Noli de Castro’s radio program on Saturday, a day after arriving from Lebanon.

They were among 85 distressed OFWs who sought shelter from the shelter inside the Philippine Embassy in Beirut.

“To all Filipinos planning to go to Lebanon, please don't go through with it because the people there are demons. Many are raped, some even go crazy," one of the distressed OFWs, Marilyn Valencia of Nueva Vizcaya province, said in Filipino. [...]

Israeli troops 'shot at from Syria'
Israeli troops in the occupied Golan Heights have come under small arms fire from Syria, Israeli military officials have said.

No one was injured in the incident on Sunday, but it was been reported to the United Nations force that monitors the area, an Israeli army spokesman said. [...]

No, dear sir. The inescapable question is, "Are you actually surprised?" As McClatchy news reminds us, this was all obvious from the beginning and throughout the whole sordid mess, for those with a will to see it. And as Laura Rozen notes, McClellan hewed to the administration's line like it was his job because it was his job.

I watched many of McClellan's press conferences during his tenure. He was a terrible liar. You could see the sweat rolling off him as he stammered his way through deflecting pointed questions. I was surprised he lasted as long as he did. It boggles me that anyone could look at the guy and not know he didn't believe anything he was saying, and that he wasn't at least a little troubled by the fact.

So this whole faux shock schtick is just ridiculous. If you didn't know you were being lied to, it's because you chose not to know. The evidence was there.

(Former) Army Commander Michel Sleiman was sworn in as president on Sunday, and the following day there was a massive fireworks display downtown followed by a concert by Lebanese diva Haifa Wehbe. Traffic was at a standstill.

But so what does Lebanon have now? It's not all sun and roses, especially for March 14. Let's look at the points of the Doha agreement for a moment.

Electing Sleiman as president. Mission accomplished, and Lebanon has a president after six months of vacuum. However, he comes in as a severely weakened president. He will get to appoint three ministers in the new cabinet, though whether the ministries in question are high powered ones (like Defense or Finance) or less so (Social Affairs or Youth and Sports) is to be seen. There are rumours that the opposition and majority will divide the "sovereign" ministries - Defense, Finance, Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and maybe Labor - equally between them, leaving none for the president.

But the real problem with a Sleiman presidency is his personality. Sleiman has made it clear over the yeares that he will shift with the strongest wind. This protects him, perhaps, but it makes him an undependable and weak ally, and certainly no true leader. His accession to the presidency allows the situation to finally move forward, but it doesn't solve the basic problem between the pro-West and pro-Syrian/Iranian factions.

The electoral law changes. The best hope for a strong Sleiman presidency, as I see it, is the dissolution of the March 14 coalition. The new electoral law allows for much more accurate representation than the 2000/2005 law. But the changes are, virtually across the board, bad for March 14.

Christian neighborhoods are no longer tied to Sunni dominated west Beirut anymore, meaning that Hariri has lost his absolute control of the cities parliamentary seats. He'll still be able to bring in 10 from west Beirut, but the nine seats in east Beirut now depend solely on the electoral fortunes of the various Christian parties. Similarly in the North, the districts are no longer tied to each other and pro-Syrian, anti-Hariri politicians like Sleiman Franjieh now have the opportunity to win their way back into parliament at March 14's expense. Jezzine, a Christian district in South Lebanon, is no longer tied to Hezbollah's electoral fortunes either, but the Christians of South Lebanon have never been friendly to the Sunni-led March 14 coalition anyway.

Until now the Northern and Beirut Christian MPs have been divided between March 14 and those clinging to Michel Aoun, who has allied with Hezbollah. But now that Aoun has lost the presidency and March 14 Christians aren't required to caucus with Hariri to get elected, we may see them drift together in a new alliance or constellation of alliances.

What's more, the Armenians are now big time power brokers in Beirut. Historically the Armenians have always followed the president, wedding the fortunes of their minority community to a major national political figure. Heavyweight Michel al-Murr generally follows the same pattern; his district is the Metn, which also contains the main Armenian stronghold of Bourj Hammoud. The president will also likely see support from his home base in the army officer ranks, where he has previously competed for support with Aoun. With Aoun now more marginalized, we may see a swing from his party to Sleiman.

So new independence for the major Christian factions, and a gathering of support behind Sleiman. That reservoir of power is his for the taking, I think, but to do so he has to lead rather than follow, something he has been loath to do up to this point. This would break or at least severely strain the March 14 coalition, as Christians largely return to sect, politically.

Better representation aside, I'm not sure that having all the major sects united (and still heavily armed) and pulling in differing directions is that good for the country. We'll see.

The national unity government. The opposition got its demand for a veto-wielding third of 11 seats in the cabinet, meaning it can veto any cabinet decision it disagrees with. This assumes that the present political alliances remain as they are, of course, which, see above, is highly questionable. But they've got it for now, and that's a major concession from March 14, possibly the biggest thing they didn't want to give in on.

Of course, this really only recognizes de jure what Hezbollah has de facto - with their arms, they were already able to veto government decisions by launching an invasion and occupation of Beirut.

There is rampant speculation on who will get nominated for what ministries, but as far as I can tell nobody has any firm idea. These things are likely still being negotiated, and the truth won't even take shape until later this week at least.

Hezbollah's arms. There was a call to refrain from the use of arms in the Doha agreement, Sleiman in his swearing in rejected the use of arms internally, and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has said that his party's arms are for fighting Israel and would not be used to achieve internal political gains.

All of this is meaningless, of course. For one, the mere fact that Hezbollah holds the arms affects internal politics. Two, all of these things have been said before and it didn't stop them from carrying on their mini civil war two weeks ago. All they have to do is accuse their internal enemies of being a fifth columnn of Zionist conspirators and voila - the use of their arms is legitimized.

Hezbollah will keep its arms until it controls the state and decides to fold the Lebanese army into itself, or until it is defeated in a new civil war. Should Syria and Israel actually make peace, it would be cornered enough that it could conceivably give up its arms grudgingly without a fight, but I highly doubt it. If anything, that scenario would precipitate a war for Hezbollah's survival. A real and lasting peace between Syria and Israel would be a mortal blow to the armed resistance as it is now, but the death throes would be probably be long and bloody.

All in all, Doha has given the Hezbollah-led opposition a major leg up. This will all be rearranged again in 2009 after the parliamentary elections, but not necessarily to March 14's benefit, assuming the alliance still exists at that point. And given last night's clashes after Nasrallah's speech (I'm trying to find the full text in Arabic now, and I'll have an analysis and response soon after), it's obvious that the underlying problems have not really been addressed. This moment of optimism isn't likely to last very long.

In the lull, and if they can't reach a deal it will only be a lull, I'd like to take a moment and note some things that have been very confused or ambiguous in the press about the clashes of the past several days.

The Opposition did not attack Future supporters in force. Tariq Jedideh, on the border of the Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs of Beirut, is Future's real stronghold in Beirut, and when Hezbollah was sweeping into West Beirut Thursday and Friday, it skirted that area. Future supporters, as well as PSP members, fought throughout other areas, but in neighborhoods they shared with Amal or SSNP supporters.

By skirting Tariq Jedideh, Hezbollah avoided taking Future head on in its true power center. So while the occupation of West Beirut is certainly a military victory for Hezbollah, it's a qualified one. Had they tried to occupy Tariq Jedideh, that victory may well have taken quite a lot longer, been a lot bloodier, and thus been a lot less awe inspiring.

Tripoli and Halba. I'm working on this story right now, but I'm just really getting started. I've seen the videos of people disrespecting SSNP bodies, I've read accounts from both sides.

From what I've seen, after the takeover of West Beirut, the Mufti of Akkar (the top Sunni religious figure in the area) called for a demonstration and supporters gathered in Tripoli and marched on the SSNP headquarters there. As they were still gathering, snipers on rooftops started shooting into the crowd, killing three boys. The boys were from three villages in the surrounding area, and when their families heard the news they armed themselves and headed towards Tripoli. They had to go by way of Halba, and encountered an SSNP roadblock there (the SSNP had been alerted that they were coming). The fought them and chased them back to their offices in Halba, and massacred them. Then they apparently kicked the bodies around some - those are the videos I've seen. They handed the offices over to the army shortly afterward.

Clashes continued in Tripoli sporadically for the next couple days, but the real danger is that the Mufti and his folks are treating this as a war between the SSNP and the Sunni sect, not just SSNP v. Future. That means the Jamaa Islamiyaa, "salafis" to those in the West, are rearing to get involved. Fatah al-Islam of Nahr al-Bared fame is also sending around faxes decrying both the "American/Israeli project" as well as the apostate Shia of Hezbollah. So watch this space for further violence.

The Christian Connection. Christian areas have been entirely unaffected by the recent clashes, despite deep divisions within the communities between pro-government and pro-opposition supporters. From reporting I've read and from talking to friends in Achrafieh, it seems Hezbollah's actions have rattled the pro-opposition Christian bloc. But while some have been knocked loose and now oppose Hezbollah and their allies, there is no large exodus from the bloc behind Michel Aoun and indeed his hard core supporters have apparently become more devoutly devoted to their cause. Aoun's orange "check mark" flags are still flying proudly and I've even seen more people wearing orange around the streets.

After the battles in the Chouf I was worried that fighting might spread next to Christian areas, pitting the Lebanese Forces against die hard Aounists, Franjieh Sleiman's pro-Syrian Marada guys (at least in Zgharta in the North), and the seemingly ubiquitous SSNP. The LF are rumored to be as heavily armed and fiesty as the Druze, but these rumors are entirely untested. I have no hunches - or rather, mutually contradictory hunches - either way. It's a big fat question mark.

Michel Aoun's memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah has been waved around as the reason why the Christian areas are safe. This strikes me as feeding the crocodile so it eats you last, but Lebanese Christians appear to be happy to let this be a Sunni/Druze-Shia conflict as much as possible, and as much as the MOU helps make that possible, it helps Aoun's standing. With business as usual proceeding throughout Christian areas even as people fought it out with machine guns and RPGs in Hamra, Aoun actually comes away looking pretty smart.

So I think the take away message here is, the FPM and their allies have little stomach for testing the LF's strength, especially while continued peace makes them look good, and the LF isn't going to start anything on its own. So peace reigns in Christendom, for now.

My colleague is working on a story on the "Shia street" reaction to the events of the past few days. In addition to the ordinary calling around to people she knows here, she is also IMing with her brother, who is working in Kazakhstan, and his friend, who is visiting him. They're emailing and calling people in Beirut's southern suburbs and villages in South Lebanon, as they're more friendly with some of the Amal fighters who've been in the thick of it recently.

Our vast global army of informants at work.

So why the attacks in the Chouf? As opposition militias were transfering control in Beirut to the army, they started a frontal assault on Jumblatt's people in the Chouf, apparently unprovoked. They fought to a stalemate over the course of Sunday, and yet even after it was agreed that PSP positions were to be handed to their friends the Arslan gang and then to the army, they continued fighting here and there. Then overnight they were attacking from the Bekaa side of the mountains, in Barouk and Niha. I'll post a map in a second.

Jumblatt intimated last night that this was some sort of personal vendetta against him. But that seems like a pretty petty reason to risk an all out civil war. It could be that they were trying to get revenge for their losses on Friday night, or rescue their captured fighters. But again that's kind of petty, those fighters are dead (friends have pictures of them after they were - yes - executed), and I'm still not convinced this was actually Hezbollah and not one or more of their proxies on the front lines. I don't think they would take the risk for a few dead SSNP or Amal guys.

One theory I heard in the office today was that Hezbollah wants to control that area because it links their positions in the Bekaa with those south of Beirut. That's more compelling, and more ominous - uniting their lines could indicate that they intend to then move from there further into hostile territory, and not back to the negotiating table.

But that's the big question. If they're not going back to the negotiating table, if they're really maneuvering for a better military position, then this is just a lull and not an end to the fighting. I don't believe they actually want to invade and occupy the rest of Lebanon. Otherwise, why withdraw from West Beirut, when they'd just have to retake it?

They could be positioning in order to support opposition Christians in battles for control of Christian areas similar to what we saw in West Beirut and the Chouf. But so far there have been no indications that opposition Christians are ready and willing to hit the streets. The recent events have left that bloc even further divided and confused, with some utterly disgusted with Aoun's alliance with Hezbollah and support for this, and others quietly cheering the assault on Sunni and Druze power.

I think the takeover of West Beirut was more peaceful than Hezbollah expected, and the government's quick capitulation left them with too big a win, and they had to withdraw. But it seems that they're not ready to go back to the table yet, despite the likelihood that they could get just about everything they've been demanding for the past year and a half. I think they know that's a poisoned chalice at this point - an "political compromise" earned at gunpoint is going to be seen as completely illegitimate. It could be that they don't have plans to go back to negotiating with the present crew, and will continue putting their friends - or the army - in charge everywhere in order to force March 14 out of power.

If that's the scenario, this is an entirely new game, and March 14 attempts to make concessions and call for dialogue are dangerously obsolete. It would also mean that this is very much not over, and that remaining March 14 strongholds - Saida (Sidon) and the Christian areas - are next. Word is coming in as I type that there is shelling in Damour, which is roughly half way from Beirut to Saida.

"They [Hezbollah] got their asses kicked," was how he put it.

"Rami" described today as a major victory for the Druze of Aley, as they successfully fought Hezbollah to a standstill in the Chouf and handed over control to the Lebanese army instead.

Where I expected bitterness or resignation, Rami was ecstatic that the PSP were able to hand over their positions to Talal Arslan's people and the army. I asked him about the relations between Jumblatt's people and Arslan's - Arslan is generally with the opposition - but he said, "Politics is one thing. The leaders, they argue and fight about politics but we won't fight each other in the street. No Druze will fight other Druze."

I think that's an exaggeration, but he seemed unperturbed about the idea of Arslan's people being involved.

To back up for a second, the way Rami described it, folks in Aley woke up today expecting that the fighting was done, that the government's capitulation last night meant a deal had been made and it was back to the table. They were shocked when the attacks started, and even now he has no idea what the motivations and strategy were.

When the attacks started, the people of Aley responded, despite calls from PSP heads - and Jumblatt himself - to stand down. Rami said it was largely normal people such as himself, a school teacher, who were doing the fighting, with a few PSP commanders disobeying orders to help out. "Normal people" is a bit of a misnomer when you're talking about the Druze and fighting, of course. They're stereotyped as a pretty bad ass bunch; just about the last group you'd want to pick a fight with if you could help it.

"I learned things today about my community - I had no idea. They fought with anything. I saw old guys, Sheikhs, with World War II guns. Guns I'd never seen. And we had no ammunition. We were taking their weapons! They'd be fighting and they would run. Throw down their weapons and run."

"I've got a new gun, now. Thank you, Iran!" He claimed 25 Hezbollah dead, and 6 Druze. I have no way of confirming that, and it's certainly not been factored into the official body count yet, but there you go.

"The PSP commanders are probably going to get in trouble. I don't care. They're not - those @(*#&$( - they're not going to come into our towns and get greeted with flowers."

Rami said of Jumblatt, "He's not talking out of both sides of his mouth. They were telling us not to fight. He's afraid of a new civil war, but we're still going to defend our community."

He was adamant that his opponents had been Hezbollah, and not a proxy group like the SSNP or Amal. I'm not sure he's correct about that - Hezbollah has a reputation for not, well, downing weapons and running. And it's not easy to identify who exactly you're fighting without more standardization of uniforms. So I'm not entirely sure what to make of all that. But there you go - a different take, fresh in from the front.

It's not clear who's refusing to lay down arms, the PSP or the opposition. I could believe either - the PSP guys on the ground are extremely loyal to Jumblatt, but they really want this fight. I can't get through to my contact in Aley - shockingly, he's not answering his cell in a firefight - so I can't be sure. Opposition forces (could be Hezbollah, could be their Druze friends) are preventing al-Arabiya from filming the fighting, which could be an indication of guilt. Or it could be a simple lack of trust between the parties ending up as a self-fulfilling prophecy as both sides "defend themselves." War is confusing, especially for those fighting it.

I entertained the notion that Jumblatt telling his people not to fight in West Beirut was in order to fall back to a more defensible position. That doesn't seem like a realistic take right now. I talked to one of the frontline PSP fighters in Aley today, and he seemed pretty confused as to what Jumblatt was doing. He and his compatriots were chomping at the bit to fight and defend their turf, but lacked clear orders from above as well as ammunition.

Jumblatt is still holed up in his place in Clemenceau in West Beirut, so perhaps he's just playing it careful until he's in a less easily (as we saw two days ago) surrounded location. My good friend "Charles Malik" at Lebanese Political Journal was of the opinion that he's operating solely from the principle of community preservation. The theory being, Jumblatt has thrown in with the idea of a western aligned democratic Lebanon because it is the best thing for his community, and he is avoiding allowing Hezbollah to drag him into open warfare because it would jeopardize that state.

I'm not sure this plan of action accomplishes that goal, however. Hezbollah - well, no. Their proxies, first Amal and the SSNP in West Beirut, and this time opposition Druze in the Chouf - has been systematically neutering the disparate March 14 parties. Future was taken out with a vengeance. The PSP have now apparently been sidelined. That leaves the Christian parties untouched, and now without any robust allies to come to their aid if they're attacked.

Not that they came to their allies aid when they were attacked, though. The past few days has highlighted a huge weakness in March 14 - it's a coalition of often fractious parties, not a unified structure. There are no March 14 fighters, there are just Druze, and Sunni, and Christian. Combined they would still face long odds in an open fight against Hezbollah, but apart they're absolutely powerless.

March 14 was always faced with three basic choices. It could completely give in to opposition demands. It could give up some of its demands - demands it was very attached to - in order to get at least part of what it wanted. That's called compromise, and for all the rhetoric about comprise these past few months it wasn't very seriously explored or discussed. Or, third, they can refuse to give in at all and go to war.

Sadly, they seem to have chosen both A) and C), the proverbial worst of both worlds. And now that it's gone to the streets, B) is no longer a realistic option.

Lebanon is quickly heading for a moment - if it's not already there - where Hezbollah simply calls all the shots. How can you accept an armed invasion of your towns and neighborhoods and then go back to the negotiating table and expect to deal with your erstwhile occupiers on anything like an equal basis?

(In more personal news, my West Beirut friends have been able to return to their homes and apartments and try to pick up the pieces.)